

~~SECRET~~

EAC #4451-81

*Chm/NIC*

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 160/81  
17 July 1981  
Copy 70

MEMORANDUM FOR: The National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT: Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM): SOVIET BALLISTIC  
MISSILE DEFENSE

1. In response to a requirement from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Attachment 1), we have initiated production of an IIM on Soviet ballistic missile defense. The attached Terms of Reference have been coordinated with your representatives and have been judged by NSC Staff members as responsive to their needs. (U)

2. The requirement that the IIM contain a comprehensive review of Soviet ballistic missile defense programs, including detailed presentations of alternative assessments, will necessitate substantive contributions from several agencies. The principal contributors for each section of the study are indicated in the Terms of Reference. It is requested that on-the-shelf assessments be submitted immediately to [ ] DIA/DT, the drafter of the IIM. Other contributions should be provided [ ] by 31 July in order that we can meet the target date for NFIB approval of this IIM in early November. (C)

3. NSC Staff members have emphasized the importance of this study to US strategic force planning, and regard it as one of the most important projects currently being undertaken by the Intelligence Community. Your support and cooperation in producing the IIM will be especially appreciated. (C)

*Henry S. Rowen*  
Henry S. Rowen

Attachments

NSC review completed.

~~SECRET~~25X1  
25X1

25X1

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE

3155

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1981

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
The Director of Central Intelligence


SUBJECT: The Soviet ABM Program

In the course of recent interdepartmental meetings on SALT, it has become clear that serious uncertainties and differences of view exist both within the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the Administration over the purpose and scope of Soviet research and development efforts in the ABM area. These uncertainties and differences have an important bearing on Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty and associated agreements, particularly the Agreed Statement on concurrent testing of ABM and air defense components of November, 1978. Some consider the analysis of the Intelligence Community to be inadequate.

Soviet ABM efforts are of critical concern to us because of the potentially severe consequences of a potential Soviet denunciation of the ABM Treaty and "breakout" from its limitations.

In view of the need to begin immediately to review the U.S. position on ABM both in the context of our own strategic programs and in connection with ongoing interagency consideration of SALT issues (including the ABM Treaty review due in 1982), it would be most helpful if you could take initiatives to create a high-level interagency review and assessment of the Soviet ABM effort. This review should involve a fresh examination of assumptions utilized within the Community in studying ABM-related issues, and should provide a thorough airing of interagency differences. It should give full weight to open source as well as classified material, and should consider in depth the question of Soviet strategic doctrine as it pertains to Soviet activities in the ABM area.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

SECRET

Review June 8, 1987

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese

**SECRET**

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied